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Failinger: Twenty-Five Years of Law and Religion

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF LAW AND RELIGION
SCHOLARSHIP: SOME REFLECTIONS
Marie A. Failinger
We might describe this moment in law and religion
scholarship as a crescendo in a rich and evocative symphony. It is an
almost impossible task to count, much less characterize, the immense
body of law and religion work being published in American law
reviews and books.1 Over the past twenty-five years, this field of
study has also flourished throughout the world, giving rise to at least
twenty specialized journals in the field,2 not to mention the


Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, and retiring Editor-in-Chief of the
Journal of Law and Religion. My thanks to Sam Levine and my co-participants at the
Religious Legal Theory conference, and to all of the scholars, not all here named in the
interests of brevity, whose work has enriched my intellectual life.
1
The references I cite comprise just a fraction of the wonderful works that could be cited.
Any obvious omissions are the result of my faulty memory and space considerations, not the
work’s worthiness. I also ask forgiveness for indulging an editor’s prerogative to focus on
those works I know well from my work with the Journal of Law and Religion and my
scholarship. Others have attempted to try to catalogue some of the work that has emerged in
the past few decades, and they will offer different citations. See John Witte, The Study of
Law and Religion in the United States: An Interim Report, 14 ECCL. L.J. 327 (2012) (tracing
the development of law and religion study in the United States); David Hollander, Jewish
Law for the Law Librarian, 98 LAW LIBR. J. 219 (2006) (providing a basic introduction to
Jewish law and primary and recent secondary sources); Samuel J. Levine, Teaching Jewish
Law in American Law Schools: An Emerging Development in Law and Religion, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041 (1999) (discussing the prominence of religion in the legal
profession); Samuel J. Levine, Teaching Jewish Law in American Law Schools—Part II: An
Annotated Syllabus, 2 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002) (introducing students to the
place of Jewish law in American law schools and legal scholarship); Howard J. Vogel, A
Survey and Commentary on the New Literature in Law and Religion, 1 J.L. & RELIGION 79
(1983) (surveying new literature in law and religion). See also 15 J.L. & RELIGION 462
(2000-2001); 16 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (2001) (surveying the “best books” in law and religion in
the 1990’s, including a bibliography of restorative and transitional justice scholarship).
2
See, e.g., ÖSTERREICHISCHES ARCHIV FÜR RECHT & RELIGION (discussing current
problems of ecclesiastical law in today’s society); the French publication, ANNUAIRE DROIT
ET RELIGIONS AND REVUE DE DROIT CANONIQUE (discussing decisions of French Courts and
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”)); three German publications, ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT (discussing all problems and aspects of Protestant
church and state law relating to religion); ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS (discussing
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outpouring of books3 and the rise of web-based conversations
through blogs such as Mirror of Justice and Religion Clause.4
However, I think there are important tributaries in this growing
stream of scholarship that are worth recognizing and reflecting on,
realizing that these streams of scholarship are more turbulent and full
of life than the surface that I will describe.
The last quarter-century of scholarly writing in law and
religion in America has been characterized by both a broadening and
a democratization of law and religion scholarship. This turn of
events has produced a rich garden bursting with new genres, themes,
and ideologies. If we were to play with this metaphor of a garden, we
might think of the central questions of traditional law and religion

developments in theories of constitutional law); KIRCHE UND RECHT: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE
KIRCHLICHE UND STAATLICHE PRAXIS (discussing ecclesiastical and state law); the British
publication, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW JOURNAL AND RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY, and the Italian
publication, QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA (discussing law and religion
topics). In both the Netherlands and in Spain, there are at least three such journals:
RELIGION, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(discussing the interactions, conflicts, and reconciliations between religion and human
rights); ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY (discussing classical and modern Islamic law); ANUARIO
DE DERECHO ECLESIASTICO DEL ESTADO (discussing law and religion topics in Spain);
DERECHO Y RELIGION (analyzing issues associated with outward expression of religion);
REVISTA GENERAL DE DER., CANÓNICO Y DER, ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO (discussing law
and religion issues); and in Switzerland, VERITAS ET JUS (discussing canon law, ecclesiastical
law, and relationships between church and state). Journals published in the United States
include the JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE (discussing constitutional, historical,
philosophical, theological, and sociological studies on religion); THE J.L. & RELIGION; THE
OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION; THE RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION (discussing the dynamic interaction
between law and religion). Some of these journals focus on special areas such as state law or
canon law, while others are international in scope.
3
Even among law and religion textbooks, the variety and number is impressive. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 2011); JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES
AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 2011)
(analyzing important developments in church-state relations); HOWARD LESNICK, RELIGION
IN LEGAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (2010); W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS,
LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2010);
LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2013); ASPEN
PUBLISHERS, LAW AND RELIGION: CASES IN CONTEXT (Leslie C. Griffin ed., 2010).
4
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Competing Claims of Law and Religion, MIRROR OF
JUST. (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2013/01/thecompeting-claims-of-law-and-religion.html (discussing Catholic legal thought in a blog cowritten by a number of authors); CTR. FOR L. AND RELIGION F., http://clrforum.org (last
visited Jan. 6, 2014); Howard Friedman, RELIGION CLAUSE, http://religionclause.blogspot.co
m (last visited Jan. 6, 2014); Neil Addison, RELIGION L. BLOG, http://religionlaw.blogspot.co
m (last visited Jan. 6, 2014); WHERE L. AND RELIGION MEET, http://www.emorylawandreligi
on.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
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studies, those framed by what I would call mainline institutions and
scholars, as the stalwart plantings in the garden. These scholars
continue to parse such questions as the relationship between the state
and religious organizations,5 the limits on the right of believers to
challenge or even disobey secular law,6 and the debate between
Enlightenment secularism and dominant religion on the role of
religious belief and activity in shaping our common life.7 Other
scholarship, like heirloom tomatoes, has deepened and sharpened our
authentic connection to a past by more correctly and richly re-telling
the actual history that shapes our imagination about religious freedom
in our time.8 This historical and political scholarship ranges wide—
5

See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and
Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1596 (2004) (describing Carl Esbeck’s work on church
autonomy, and posing the uncertainty of historical application of voluntary principle in cases
of government aid to religious organizations, promotion of religious ideas, such as through
prayer in the public schools, and protection of believers against generally applicable laws);
William Johnson Everett, Ecclesial Freedom and Federal Order: Reflections on the Pacific
Homes Case, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 371 (1996) (discussing state intervention into structure
religious health care facility organization); Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation of
Religiously Based Social Services: The First Amendment Considerations, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 343 (1992) (attempting a methodology for determining First Amendment
limitations on government regulation of religious institutions). Edward McGlynn Gaffney,
Jr. has written regularly on this topic. See, e.g., Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Not
Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality of the Regulation of Activities of Religious
Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1990).
6
See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of
Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899 (1995) (describing the history of the modern
Sanctuary movement in the U.S.).
7
See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Secular Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism and
the Search for Truth in Contemporary America, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 337 (1995) (discussing
ways in which secular assumptions about private life and truth, interpretation and liberal
values are fundamentalist, and critiquing fundamentalist thinking); Franklin I. Gamwell,
Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 325 (1984) (discussing the
Framers’ commitment to rational public argument and the importance of religion to public
life).
8
These historical works range over a large number of subjects. See, e.g., Lucas P.
Volkman, Church Property Disputes, Religious Freedom, and the Ordeal of African
Methodists in Antebellum St. Louis: Farrar v. Finney (1855), 27 J.L. & RELIGION 83 (20112012) (describing the 19th century history of a church property dispute between white and
African American Methodists when the Methodist Church split over the question of slavery);
Steven Wedgeworth, “The Two Sons of Oil” and the Limits of American Religious Dissent,
27 J.L. & RELIGION 141 (2011-2012) (describing the fight between two Covenanter
Presbyterians, Samuel Brown Wylie and William Findley, who fought over whether the
American Constitution was compatible with Christian principles); William G. Ross, The
Role of Religion in the Defeat of the 1937 Court-Packing Plan, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 629
(2007-2008) (describing how religious leaders’ and organizations’ concerns about threats to
religious liberty protected by the Supreme Court helped form the coalition defeating the
court-packing plan).
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for example, it re-tells the story of English and European
Enlightenment responses to the religious wars,9 the story of American
leaders’ responses to religious diversity in the colonies and early
American history,10 the interaction between Muslim rulers and
scholars in the early medieval period,11 the struggle of Jews to find an
authentically Jewish interpretive voice in the modern age,12 and the
influence of Hinduism or Buddhism on modern nation-states from
India to Korea,13 to touch only the surface. This scholarship also
9

See, e.g., Peter G. Danchin, The Emergence and Structure of Religious Freedom in
International Law Reconsidered, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 455 (2007-2008) (arguing that the
standard story tracing the rise of secularism from the Reformation and Peace of Westphalia
to the Enlightenment and modern life fails to capture the complex value pluralism that
existed throughout this history); Harold J. Berman, Conscience and Law: The Lutheran
Reformation and the Western Tradition, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 177 (1987) (describing the “legal
reformation” that occurred after Luther and others reformed the church). John Witte, Jr. has
written extensively on post-Reformation law reform. See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM
SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (2d
ed. 2012) (tracing the development of marriage law from Catholic canon law to Lutheran,
Calvinist, Anglican and Enlightenment influences on secular law).
10
See, e.g., STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (2010) (examining the development of church and state
during the nineteenth century); Robert Emery, Church and State in the Early Republic: The
Covenanters’ Radical Critique, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 487 (2009-2010) (describing
Revolutionary War-era critique of Reformed Presbyterians about the nature of state
authority); David M. Cobin & Earl Schwartz, The Encrypted Sermons of Sabato Morais, 23
J.L. & RELIGION 147 (2007-2008) (presenting 1861-1862 anti-slavery sermons of American
rabbi Sabato Morais); Arlin Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, William Penn and the American
Heritage of Religious Liberty, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 57 (1990) (describing how Penn’s view of
ultimate allegiance owing God over the state influenced Penn’s vision for the Pennsylvania
colony).
11
See, e.g., WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW (2009). This is
Hallaq’s more concise introduction to pre-modern Islamic law and the influence of
colonization on Muslim legal institutions. Id.
12
See, e.g., Yosef Lindell, A Science Like Any Other? Classical Legal Formalism in the
Halakhic Jurisprudence of Rabbis Isaac Jacob Reines and Moses Avigdor Amiel, 28 J.L. &
RELIGION 179, 179 (2012-2013) (describing how these late nineteenth century rabbis
attempted, like their secular contemporaries, to order Jewish law along a “scientific” and
rational model); Amihai Radzyner, Between Scholar and Jurist: The Controversy over the
Research of Jewish Law Using Comparative Methods at the Early Time of the Field, 23 J.L.
& RELIGION 189, 191-92 (2007-2008) (discussing debates in the Jewish law society over the
interpretation of halakhah, or Jewish law).
13
See, e.g., Mark Nathan, The Encounter of Buddhism and Law in Early TwentiethCentury Korea, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (2009-2010) (revising the view that Japanese colonial
rule over Korea was responsible for the influence of Buddhism in that country and
considering whether Buddhist reforms incorporated with secular legal norms on
proselytizaton to create modern Korean Buddhist institutions); Debarati Halder & K.
Jaishankar, Property Rights of Hindu Women: A Feminist Review of Succession Laws of
Ancient, Medieval, and Modern India, 24 J.L. & RELIGION 663 (2008-2009) (critiquing of the
restriction of Hindu women’s property rights in India during ancient, medieval and modern
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deepens, and makes more complex, the record of stories that have
become commonplace to us, from the debates over abortion14 and
evolution15 to the protection of Native American sacred sites16 and
local conflicts over the siting of houses of worship.17
Some of this scholarship, like the perennial vegetables in the
garden, is focused on maintaining our relationships with each other in
the highly pluralistic, contentious geography in which we live
together. While much of it focuses on traditional legal issues, such as
parsing the First Amendment,18 the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (“RFRA”),19 or state and federal religious non-discrimination
statutes in the U.S.20 and other nations,21 in my mind, the most
times).
14
See generally ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: IS
ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993) (tracing the history of fundamentalist and mainstream
Protestant and Catholic influences on the abortion debate in the U.S.).
15
For a complex history of the Scopes trial, see EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE
GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA’S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION
(1997).
16
See, e.g., Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative
Approach to Cultural Conflict over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 757 (2001) (describing how conflicting Native and white meta-narratives
resulted in the legal conflict over the protection of American Indian sacred sites).
17
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest and
Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021, 1049 (2012); Douglas Laycock, State RFRAS
and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 755 (1999) (describing legal conflicts
over exemptions for houses of worship).
18
Among the regular contributors to these debates are: STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995);
MARCI HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005) (discussing
the impropriety of court exemptions for religious conduct in cases such as protection of
children in faith healing families and religious land use accommodations); Thomas C. Berg,
Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 187 (2001)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s move from strict separation to religious equality and
critiquing its failure to emphasize religious freedom as the core value of the Religion
Clauses); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 117 (1992) (critiquing Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence and arguing
for the Court to “foster a regime of religious pluralism . . . .”); Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990)
(arguing that the Religion Clauses should be read to guarantee substantive neutrality).
19
See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits
of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. Rev. 247 (1994) (questioning whether RFRA would have
the effect of discouraging state or court moves to encourage religious liberty).
20
See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach
to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 729 (1996) (proposing a
discursive approach to employment-related religious accommodation informed “by the
principles and ideals of tolerance, equality, neutrality, and inclusion.”).
21
See, e.g., Gerhard Robbers, Church Autonomy in the European Court of Human
Rights—Recent Developments in Germany, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 281, 283-84 (2010-2011)
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important work in this area asks about the ethics of community in a
religiously pluralistic culture.22 Whether they are writing about
religious speech or international human rights, scholars like Michael
Perry,23 Kent Greenawalt24 and many others have asked establishment
lawyers, judges, and scholars to consider what moral duties we owe
each other, and especially, what duties we American public elites
owe the rest of our society, from humility about our truths to careful
listening and embracing of the Other.25
But if we looked at the garden of law and religion scholarship
from the gate, we would see that these stalwart plantings, critical as
they are, are almost overshadowed by the luxuriant growth of all sorts
of other scholarly work. Some of this work, like a grafted plant,
(describing recent church autonomy cases in the ECHR and arguing that tolerance and
respect be given not only to issues of worship and ritual practice, but also to religious beliefs
about the way religious communities should be structured, including respect for ways in
which religious communities differ from general secular behavior and norms); see also
Carolyn Evans, Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human
Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 321 (2010-2011)
(describing the work of the ECHR on religious freedom issues involving religious
registration and headscarves worn by Muslim women).
22
The efforts of Ayelet Shachar to describe and re-define the relationship between
religious communities and secular states on behalf of religious women caught between two
worlds are most prominently illustrated in her award-winning text AYELET SHACHAR,
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS (2001). See
also Roshan Danesh, Church and State in the Bahá’í Faith: An Epistemic Approach, 24 J.L.
& RELIGION 21, 25 (2008-2009) (suggesting that the Bahá’í theological vision is compatible
with pluralistic forms of government); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF
CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 4 (1995)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s religion decisions evince “the displacement of a
religiously informed communitarian discourse on public morality and politics by a secular,
neutral, individualist discourse on such matters.”).
23
Two of Perry’s many works along this line are MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE & POWER: THE
ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); and MICHAEL J. PERRY,
THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES (1998).
24
As one example of his work, see KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND
PUBLIC REASONS 6-7 (1995) (arguing that liberal democracies should not prohibit all morally
problematical actions because of pluralistic views about human good, and should permit
citizens to rely on their religious and moral convictions when they are proposing solutions to
contested social problems).
25
See, e.g., PERRY, LOVE & POWER, supra note 23, at 125, 132-37 (arguing for
“ecumenical political dialogue” characterized by the concerns for “fallibilism (in conjunction
with pluralism), self-interest, [tolerance,] compassion, community, and conscientiousness”);
M. Cathleen Kaveny, Diversity and Deliberation, 34 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 311, 311, 317-18,
333 (2006) (discussing dialogical diversity on a presidential bioethics commission); Mark A.
Chinen, Crumbs from the Table: The Syrophoenician Woman and International Law, 27 J.L.
& RELIGION 1 (2011-2012) (following theologian Miroslav Volf and arguing that
international law can be guided by a metaphor of reconciliation as self-sacrificial embrace of
the Other).
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certainly engages traditional scholarship on its own terms, pointing
out some missing insight from a different jurisprudential, historical,
or philosophical approach. Other work, however, starts from
completely new seed, independently formed and sometimes almost
dismissive of the garden stalwarts.
What is especially telling about a considerable amount of this
scholarship is that it is unapologetically religious. By that, I mean
that its authors disclose their religious traditions, experiences, and
commitments forthrightly. In some cases, they are telling stories of
their own religious journeys.26 In other cases, they use the language,
narratives and ritual rhythms of their faith traditions to frame and
explain what they have learned about the interweaving of law and
religion in their own lives, in their own communities, in thought
itself.27 Some work is autodidactic, evincing the author’s own
attempt to learn a tradition he or she missed in a madrasa or
synagogue or Sunday school.28 Some is confessional, asserting who
26
See, e.g., HOWARD LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD: RELIGION AND MORAL DISCERNMENT
(Author’s Choice Press 2007) (1998); REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE
LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TIBET 341-47 (1995) (describing her encounter with a
Buddhist monk and its effect on her understanding of Buddhist theology).
27
See, e.g., Chinen, supra note 25 (using the Biblical story of the Syrophoenician woman
to probe the foundations of international human rights); Howard Lesnick, No Other Gods:
Answering the Call of Faith in the Practice of Law, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 459 (2002-2003)
(quoting Thomas L. Shaffer, The Tension between Law in America and the Religious
Tradition, in LAW AND THE ORDERING OF OUR LIFE TOGETHER 28, 45 (Richard John Neuhaus
ed., 1989) (describing Thomas Shaffer’s work as an argument that a lawyer is a person
“called out of the church, sent out from [a] particular people, to do something that is
religiously important”)); Jawdat Said, Law, Religion and the Prophetic Method of Social
Change, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 83 (2000-2001) (discussing the Quran’s understanding of
humanity and the roots of historical violence in human history); Perry Dane, The Yoke of
Heaven, the Question of Sinai, and the Life of Law, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 353 (1994) (arguing
that revelation is not a prerequisite to accepting halakhic responsibilities). Much of this
work is part of what Russell Pearce and Amy Uelman have called “the religious lawyering
movement,” which aims at being self-reflective about the place of a lawyer’s faith in his or
her professional work. For a description of this movement, see Robert K. Vischer, Heretics
in the Temple of Law: The Promise and Peril of the Religious Lawyering Movement, 19 J.L.
& RELIGION 427 (2004) (arguing that the analogy of lawyers to priests in the legal profession
must be discarded in favor of a new paradigm that both respects the communal aspects of
religious lawyering and the foundations of the project of liberalism). See also Russell G.
Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering’s Second Wave, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 269
(2005-2006) (discussing the “first wave” of discussion focusing on whether lawyers should
bring their faith traditions to bear on their professional work and “second wave” on how
lawyers should do so).
28
Most of this work remains unpublished because sophisticated lawyers do not have an
equally sophisticated understanding of their own religious traditions, making the job of
producing scholarship balanced in complexity between law and religion more difficult.
Nonetheless, most such writing has value in the development of the author’s understanding
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God is and what we can know of God and God’s work in the world.29
But even in that work framed in what some would call more
“objective” or “observational” language, the author often discloses
his or her faith history in the choice of subject, approach, or
argument.30
This willingness to speak out of one’s own faith tradition is a
welcome development for many reasons. From the speaker’s
perspective, it is more authentic, allowing the author to describe his
own and his community’s experience in a way not distorted or
diminished by politically or socially dominant voices in this nation.
The hearer or reader of these pieces written in an explicitly religious
voice may also test the speaker’s propositions to see if they ring true
to his or her own faith community’s experience or that of his or her
other community of identity. He or she can also identify parallel
experiential grounds to assent to, enrich, criticize, or reject
propositional claims. Such authentic speech also adds to the diversity
of voice in the larger community replacing stereotypes about
particular religions with truths, signaling a welcome to still others
who may have been timid about raising religiously informed voices
in public space, and creating respect for traditions that have been
forgotten or misheard through the ages.
Out of this new abundance of voices, the dynamic of law and
religion discussion has undergone a dramatic change. Law and
religion scholarship was once heavily centered on the concerns of
mainline law and religion scholars whose thought structures were
of his or her own tradition.
29
See, e.g., David K. DeWolf & Robert J. Araujo, And God’s Justice Shall Become Ours:
Reflections on Teaching Law in a Catholic University, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 37, 37 (1998)
(noting that “the realization that everything depends on God's transcendent truth lies at the
heart of seeking and doing justice”); Ze’ev W. Falk, Gender Differentiation and Spirituality,
13 J.L. & RELIGION 85, 87 (1995-1996) (discussing the need for Jewish scholars to engage
feminists to ensure that criticism of patriarchal structures will be supplemented with a new
Jewish theology that embodies the idea of the Torah, which “means primarily selfeffacement vis-à-vis God and readiness to stand in judgment before Him”).
30
See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Supreme Court Justices: A
Theological Analysis, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296 (2006) (using the evangelical doctrine of
sphere sovereignty and common grace, and the Catholic doctrines of natural law and
subsidiarity to explain Supreme Court members’ jurisprudence and the composition of the
Court); Mohammed Abu-Nimer, A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam,
25 J.L. & RELIGION 217 (2000-2001) (describing an Islamic theory of nonviolence and
peacebuilding); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pilgrim Law, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 255, 264 (1994-1995)
(describing the quest of Christian jurisprudence to “pursue an unknown end by inefficacious
means” such as “pilgrim law”).
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embedded in powerful majority religions in America. The narrative
they have shaped responds to concerns such as mediating a
constitutional course between individual freedom and social
control,31 the definition of equality for religious individuals and
groups,32 the necessity of parallel treatment of religious and secular
institutions,33 and the contours of individual freedom to dissent.34
Generally, cultural and religious minorities—Jews, Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, Native religionists, “peculiar” Christians,35 and religious
women, among others—have been imagined by this scholarship (if at
all) as strangers or outsiders, either invisible or challenging to the
traditional American imagination.36 Put another way, they have been
31
See, e.g., Daniel R. Heimbach, Contrasting Views of Religious Liberty: Clarifying the
Relationship between Responsible Government and the Freedom of Religion, 11 J.L. &
RELIGION 715 (1994-1995) (discussing the reasons for protecting religious liberty and
constraints on it to preserve the security of the civil order).
32
See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher Programs through a Liberty,
Equality and Free Speech Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REV. 871 (1999) (discussing, in part, whether
a constitutional regime requiring similar funding for both religious and secular schools is
necessary).
33
See, e.g., Robin Charlow, The Elusive Meaning of Religious Equality, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1529, 1531 (2005) (examining the difficulty of arriving at a meaning for religious
equality). For a discussion of how theology can inform the equality principle generally, see
Robin W. Lovin, Equality and Covenant Theology, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 241, 243 (1984)
(arguing that Puritan social thought shares “voluntaristic [tendencies] and egalitarian
tendencies” with contractarian philosophy, informed by the values of dignity and equal
participation).
34
See, e.g., Milton R. Konvitz, Civil Disobedience: Reflections on the Contribution of
James Luther Adams, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 9, 10-11 (1995-1996) (discussing Adams’ 1970
essay on the limits of civil disobedience); John T. Noonan, Jr., Principled or Pragmatic
Foundations for the Freedom of Conscience?, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 203 (1987) (discussing
theological warrants in Augustine and Aquinas for freedom of conscience); Douglas Sturm,
Constitutionalism and Conscientiousness: The Dignity of Objection to Military Service, 1
J.L. & RELIGION 265 (1983) (arguing that constitutionalism, and the Free Exercise Clause
specifically, should be read as guaranteeing the right of a conscientious objector not to
participate in war, even if his objection is to a specific war).
35
See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Religion, Education and the Theoretically Liberal State:
Contrasting Evangelical and Secularist Perspectives, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 99, 103
(2005) (discussing how Christian evangelicals are perceived as threatening and stereotyped);
see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 6-7 (1993) (“Our culture seems to take the
position that believing deeply in the tenets of one's faith represents a kind of mystical
irrationality . . . .”).
36
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997) (arguing that the
American tradition of church-state separation has been used to dominate minority religions,
particularly focusing on Judaism); Azizah Yahia al-Hibri, Muslim Women’s Rights in the
Global Village: Challenges and Opportunities, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 37, 46-55 (2000-2001)
(describing women’s rights in the original Islamic understanding).
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an ethical and constitutional “problem” to be addressed by mainline
scholars.37
However, the democratization of law and religion has meant
that the conversation between mainline law and religion scholars and
“outsider” scholars has become bi-directional. To be sure, in one
direction, establishment law and religion scholars have reached out to
embrace the work of scholars from these outsider traditions,
legitimizing them and their work in the academy and the scholarly
community.38 And they have nurtured scholarly communities
emerging from within these once “outsider” religions.39
In the other direction, however, “outsider” religion scholars
are independently shaping their ideas from the soil of their own
traditions. As they do, they have reached out to include mainline law
and religion scholars in their conversations as well. At the risk of
trivializing these conversations by categories, I would suggest at least
five current streams characterizing what was once “outsider”
scholarship. Many law and religion scholars working in such
“outsider” traditions have published work in more than one of these
streams, and indeed, some individual scholarly works reflect more
than one of these streams.
One of these streams, notably among Islamic law scholars but
one which I believe can also be seen in Jewish law and evangelical

37
Scott Idleman has argued that religion poses a threat that it will compete with the state
for sovereignty, which accounts for the failure of minority religious claims to prevail in
constitutional adjudication. Scott C. Idleman, Why the State Must Subordinate Religion, in
LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 175, 186 (2000). Of course, there are some
notable exceptions to my claim—for example, we would be remiss not to acknowledge the
significant impact that Jewish scholars and lawyers have made on mainline Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., J. David Holcomb, Religion in
Public Life: The ‘Pfefferian Inversion’ Reconsidered, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 57-58 (2009-2010)
(discussing the church-state separation philosophy of Leo Pfeffer, termed “arguably the
twentieth century’s most influential voice for the separation of church and state.”).
38
For example, see the fellowship and research programs at Emory University’s Center
for the Study of Religion and Law, Research Opportunities, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF LAW
AND RELIGION, http://cslr.law.emory.edu/joint-degree-program/research-opportunities// (last
visited Jan. 6, 2014); and Mission & History, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF LAW AND RELIGION,
http://cslr.law.emory.edu/about/mission-history/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
I will,
hereinafter, refer to the “Center for the Study of Law and Religion” as “CSLR.”
39
See, e.g., Twenty-first Annual Journal of Law and Religion Symposium: “Emerging
Voices in Islamic Jurisprudence”, HAMLINE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://law.hamline.edu/Content.aspx?id=4294974878 (last visited Jan. 6, 2014); Islam and
Human Rights Fellowship Program, CSLR, http://cslr.law.emory.edu/research/islamic-legalstudies/islam-and-human-rights-fellowship-program/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
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literature,40 is corrective. This scholarship attempts to rebut popular
Western misconceptions about the outsider religion and its views.
This is crucially important scholarship, because both the public and
lawyers and judges too often get their ideas about religious traditions
from those ignorant about the traditions, even sometimes from racists
and fearmongers.41 In terms of this corrective scholarship, I think of
the work of scholars like Asifa Quraishi-Landes and Azizah alHibri,42 whose work is vital to combating this disinformation,
particularly within our own profession. This scholarship is critical
because without trust, and without truth, it is difficult to build a
lasting political or social community in a religiously pluralistic world.
A second stream of scholarship works at building bridges.
Recognizing that they stand with feet in both worlds, one in their own
tradition and one in the mainline tradition, these scholars have
attempted to bring the conversation between the traditions together,
by pointing out their similar or even parallel theological and ethical
approaches to legal problems that have recurred throughout human
history. I think of Sam Levine’s work in comparative criminal law
and legal interpretation,43 as well as other Jewish law comparative
40

See, e.g., Suzanne Last Stone, Spinoza’s Identity and Philosophy: Jewish or
Otherwise?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 581 (2003) (debunking the myth that “American law
shares an intellectual affinity with Jewish law”); David M. Smolin, Religion, Education and
the Theoretically Liberal State: Contrasting Evangelical and Secularist Perspectives, 44 J.
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 99, 103-07 (2005) (discussing stereotypes about evangelical Christians
and politics).
41
For a discussion of these stereotypes, see Sahar Aziz, Sticks and Stone, the Words that
Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years after 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33 (2009)
(describing how stereotypes influence racial profiling, anti-terrorism legislation and case law
as well as proposing causes of action to combat these dangers); David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt
by Association and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 267, 268 (2000-2001) (arguing
that the Immigration and Nationalization Service’s use of secret evidence and guilt by
association is driven by stereotypes, ignorance and prejudice).
42
See, e.g., Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Rumors of the Sharia Threat are Greatly
Exaggerated: What American Judges Really Do with Islamic Family Law in their
Courtrooms, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 245, 247 (2012-2013) (dispelling myths about the
effect of so-called “sharia law” on American law); Azizah Yahia al-Hibri, Muslim Women’s
Rights in the Global Village: Challenges and Opportunities, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 37, 37-39
(2000-2001) (describing basic tenets of Islam regarding women’s rights for both Islamic and
non-Islamic audiences in an attempt to show both audiences that “Islam is not a mere
‘Oriental’ religion, but a world religion which is capable of meeting the needs of Muslims in
all historical eras and all geographical locations.”).
43
See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking Self-Incrimination, Voluntariness, and Coercion, through the Perspective of Jewish Law and Legal Theory, 12 J.L. SOCIETY 72 (20102011); Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and its Application: A
Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1037 (1998) (discussing comparatively the
underpinnings of Jewish and American law on coerced confessions and capital punishment);
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work on commercial exploitation of others by Shahar Liftschitz, or
on freedom of speech and inciting language by Jonathan Crane.44
Islamic jurisprudence boasts similar efforts to compare its
jurisprudence to secular American and other mainstream schools of
jurisprudence, by scholars like Quraishi-Landes, Intisar Rabb, and
Sadiq Reza.45 This conversation is important, not only for building
trust among religious communities, but for establishing common
ground on which we can move forward in the practical task of lawmaking in pursuit of our desire to create a more just community.
A third stream might be termed “invited to observe” work. In
this stream, law and religion scholars, who once primarily conversed
with others from their own tradition in journals aimed exclusively at
members of that tradition, have moved these conversations into
mainline journals or books.46
Thus, for example, honest
Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction to Legislation in Jewish Law, with References to the
American Legal System, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 916 (1999) (comparing Jewish and
American legislative assumptions).
44
See, e.g., Shahar Lifshitz, Oppressive-Exploitative Contracts: A Jewish Law
Perspective, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 425 (2007-2008) (comparing Jewish law’s focus in
unconscionability cases on individual distress and modern secular law’s focus on individual
autonomy); Jonathan K. Crane, Defining the Unspeakable: Incitement in Halakhah and
Anglo American Jurisprudence, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 329, 330-33 (2010) (showing how the
Jewish law of incitement focuses on threats to the integrity of the Jewish community, while
Anglo-American law focuses on specific and imminent harm to individuals). Professor
Levine has catalogued comparative approaches in Jewish law in more than one article. See,
e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Emerging Application of Jewish Law in American Legal Scholarship:
An Introduction, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 43 (2007-2008) (composing a bibliography of such
works). This conversation occurs also from the standpoint of other traditions. See, e.g.,
Gregory A. Kalscheur, Christian Scripture and American Scripture: An Instructive
Analogy?, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 101 (2005-2006) (comparing interpretive principles in
constitutional and Biblical interpretation).
45
See, e.g., Asifa Quraishi, On Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps
Me Understand American Constitutional Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 339, 340-41 (2009)
(describing how a review of qadi practice “illustrates that the Court simultaneously performs
two roles: it is both the final adjudicator of constitutional disputes and also the ultimate
expositor of constitutional law.”); Sadiq Reza, Islam’s Fourth Amendment: Search and
Seizure in Islamic Doctrine and Muslim Practice, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 703, 708-09, 722
(2009) (refuting arguments that Fourth Amendment-like search and seizure protections
existed in traditional Islamic law, though suggesting that the foundations for such protections
can be found); Intisar A. Rabb, The Islamic Rule of Lenity: Judicial Discretion and Legal
Canons, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1299, 1302 (2001) (arguing that the rule of lenity in
Islam evidences stronger legislative authority by judges than the American rule).
46
See, e.g., Sister Sara Butler, Catholic Women and Equality: Women in the Code of
Canon Law, in FEMINISM, LAW AND RELIGION 345-66 (Marie A. Failinger et al eds., 2013)
[“hereinafter FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE”] (arguing that canon law treats Catholic
women as equals, despite their exclusion from the priesthood); Susan J. Stabile, The Catholic
Church and Women: The Divergence Between What is Said and What is Heard, in
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conversations about the competitive relationship between Jewish and
secular authorities in the State of Israel,47 or the response of religious
communities to wife-beating48 or whether mix-gendered prayers are
permitted in Islam49 is now occurring out in the open, for the rest of
the world to hear. But in these conversations, non-Jews and nonMuslims are invited in primarily as observers to these internal
debates rather than as full conversation partners.50 This “invited to
observe” stream of law and religious scholarship is important for at
least two reasons. First, it signals a level of trust in the rest of the law
and religion community, assuming that those of us who are not part
of these religious communities will neither use these internal
conversations to demean or distort our description of that tradition to
others, and that we will have the common sense not to try to control
this conversation, asserting our own intellectual privilege. I hope, of
course, those of us who are so trusted will continue to earn that trust
by faithfully supporting and accurately transmitting these internal
conversations.
Second, if those of us who are outsiders to particular
traditions can observe such conversations as silent listeners, we have
a better prospect of achieving a minimally competent understanding
FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra, at 63-80 (arguing that, regardless of their exclusion
from the priesthood, Catholic women should be more visible in the Church, in areas such as
liturgy and non-priestly positions of authority, to demonstrate Catholicism’s commitment to
women’s equality); Hina Azam, Competing Approaches to Rape in Islamic Law, in
FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra, at 327-39 (describing debate among Islamic
scholars about whether rape was considered a form of zina, or adultery in classical Islamic
law).
47
See, e.g., Daphna Hacker, Religious Tribunals in Democratic States: Lessons from the
Israeli Rabbinical Courts, 27 J.L. & RELIGION 59 (2011-2012) (describing the competition
for “business” between religious and secular courts in Israel, and contending that religious
courts have changed their practices to compete with these courts); Adam S. HofriWinogradow, A Plurality of Discontent: Legal Pluralism, Religious Adjudication and the
State, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 57 (2010-2011) (describing Israel’s integrationist model for
including rabbinical courts, and comparing it with Western community court models).
48
See, e.g., Naomi Graetz, Jewish Law: The Case of Wifebeating, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ
AND STABILE, supra note 46, at 307-28; Juliane Hammer, “Men are the Protectors of
Women” Negotiating Marriage, Feminism, and (Islamic) Law in American Muslim Efforts
Against Domestic Violence, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra note 46, at 237-54.
49
See, e.g., Ahmed Elewa & Laury Silvers, “I am one of the People”: A Survey and
Analysis of Legal Arguments on Woman-Led Prayer in Islam, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 141, 14143 (2011) (discussing the controversial “Wadud prayer” and debating whether Islamic law
permits, or should be immediately reformed to permit, women to lead mixed-gender
prayers).
50
See supra notes 46-49 (compiling resources inviting outside scholars to observe the
traditions and discussions of various traditions).
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of the rich complexity of such religious communities—something
that seems almost impossible without the ability to listen in to these
internal scholarly conversations. I can’t imagine, for example, how
one could even get close to understanding the role of women in
Buddhist religious society51 or the difficult situation of the agunah in
Jewish law,52 without listening to this internal conversation, and I am
honored to have been allowed to listen. At some point, those of us
who are outsiders to these traditions may have insights to contribute
as persons able to stand outside a tradition and see it in a different
way, but this task is a delicate matter and requires an invitation from
those inside if it is going to be at all useful.
A fourth stream of this scholarship is prophetic or critical. It
often accepts the mainline conversation on law and religion as a
starting ground, but argues, from within one or more religious
traditions, that the law embodies problematical ethical or theological
assumptions about the nature of the human person, his or her
relationship to others, the good community, etc.53 While again I risk
trivializing, usually the chief goal of such literature is not simply to
argue that outsider traditions are superior to the mainline tradition or
others. Sometimes, of course, some of this literature tries to
encourage the mainline tradition to adopt some of the ethical values
of an outsider religious tradition in framing jurisprudence, law and
legal systems.54 Other times, this prophetic literature wants to
51

See, e.g., Rebecca Redwood French, Daughters of the Buddha: The Sakyadhita
Movement, Buddhist Law and the Position of Buddhist Nuns, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND
STABILE, supra note 46, at 371-87; see also Mary Szto, Chinese Women Lawyers and Judges
as Priests, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra note 46, at 391-402 (comparing
traditional exclusion of women from Chinese religious roles to modern-day embrace of such
women in priest-like roles).
52
See, e.g., Avishalom Westreich, The “Gatekeepers” of Jewish Family Law: Marriage
Annulment as a Test Case, 27 J.L. & RELIGION 329 (2011-2012) (discussing internal Jewish
law debates over whether marriage annulment can legitimately be used to free the agunah
from her “chained” fate).
53
See, e.g., Nimat Hafez Barazangi, Why Muslim Women are Re-interpreting the Qur’an
and Hadith: A Transformative Scholarship-Activism, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE,
supra note 46, at 257-76 (arguing that Muslim women’s interpretation of religious texts is
critical to achieving justice for women and an authentic understanding of Islam’s vision for
humankind).
54
See, e.g., Lifschitz, supra note 44, at 448-53 (arguing that secular law shares some of
the values of Jewish law regarding oppressive contracts, but can be inspired to incorporate a
better balance of individuality and solidarity in a dialogue with Jewish law); Amina Wadud,
Towards a Qur’anic Hermeneutics of Social Justice: Race, Class, and Gender, 12 J.L. &
RELIGION 37, 38 (1995-1996) (arguing for a vision of social justice informed by the Qur’an,
noting that “[f]rom [a] Muslim perspective, the Qur’anic world-view provides the most
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question whether the mainline tradition has lost its way, either
because its founding ethical principles have been corroded over time
or because they have been misapplied because of competing and
distorting concerns.55 Such literature sometimes argues that the
mainline tradition should wield power making, interpreting, or
enforcing secular law in a way that is truer to its own core. Examples
of this genre, to my mind, include the work on Martin Luther King’s
Beloved Community,56 evangelical Christian critiques of law’s
failure to protect human rights,57 Jewish understandings of law as
obligation,58 Buddhism’s critique of the law from its fundamental
value of compassion,59 and Islam’s vision of human rights.60
Finally, while they are often difficult to distinguish from the
prophetic or critical, some streams of outsider law and religion
scholarship might be termed transformational. As the name suggests,
prophetic or critical literature primarily attempts to push mainline

efficient avenue for comprehensive alleviation of problems of oppression.”).
55
See, e.g., Frances Raday, Modesty Disrobed: Gendered Modesty Rules under the
Monotheistic Religions, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra note 46, at 283-306
(showing how religious modesty rules, which served important religious values, were used
by religious patriarchies to keep women in subordinate places).
56
See, e.g., Anthony Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense
of Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959, 959 (2000) (following Dr. King’s
metaphor of the Beloved Community, arguing for a move “from a fear-based conception of
justice prevalent in Liberal theories to a love-based conception of justice that valorized the
principles of spiritual unity and interdependent existence.”).
57
See, e.g., David P. Gushee, Evangelicals and Politics: A Rethinking, 23 J.L. & RELIGION
1 (2008) (discussing the 2004 National Association of Evangelicals for the Health of the
Nation statement describing human rights that evangelicals support); but see Joel A. Nichols,
Evangelicals and Human Rights: The Continuing Ambivalence of Evangelical Christians’
Support for Human Rights, 24 J.L. & RELIGION 629 (2008-2009) (discussing difficulties with
evangelical support of secular human rights assumptions).
58
See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5
J.L. & RELIGION 65 (1987) (contrasting jurisprudence based on rights and on mitzvoth).
59
See, e.g., Deborah J. Cantrell, With Compassion and Lovingkindness: One Feminist
Buddhist’s Exploration of Feminist Domestic Violence Advocacy, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ
AND STABILE, supra note 46, at 219-36 (correcting Western feminist understandings of
Buddhism’s precept of compassion as neglecting patriarchal power, and describing how
Buddhism’s focus on connectedness and loving kindness permits feminists to respond to
domestic violence in ways other than anger).
60
See, e.g., Anver M. Emon, Natural Law and Natural Rights in Islamic Law, 20 J.L. &
RELIGION 351 (2004-2005) (rejecting the view that Islamic law is positivist and proposing an
authentically Islamic natural rights tradition that can inform international human rights
debates); Ebrahim Moosa, The Dilemma of Islamic Human Rights Schemes, 15 J. L &
RELIGION 185, 214-15 (2000-2001) (arguing that secular and Muslim human rights traditions
are differently informed, and that Muslim theorists should re-think their views on rights
given changes in human society and concepts of self and other).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 [2014], Art. 2

24

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

traditions to acknowledge how the law has strayed from its founding
values. Transformational scholarship discards many of the basic
premises of mainline scholarship, including assumptions about proper
genres, anthropological and sociological presumptions about human
nature and activity, and ethical first principles.
Instead,
transformational scholarship proposes its own. Some feminist law
and religion scholarship, for example, fit this description of
transformation, by rejecting many of the premises of mainline law
and religion scholarship.61 In terms of genre, it has followed other
feminist scholarship in discarding purely philosophical arguments in
favor of (at least partial) narrative; it uses personal, concrete and
metaphorical language rather than abstract, logical generalization,62
and occasionally it uses poetic, dramatic or other genres through
which to speak.63 As with other feminist scholarship, it discards
presumptions about human nature and interaction, such as
assumptions that human beings are distinct, isolated, self-focused,
and that they primarily thrive on individual freedom, personal
achievement, and material well-being.64 Indeed, it may call into
question our Western understanding of the law itself, for example, as
Emily Hartigan has done in thinking the spirit of the law.65 As with
other feminist scholarship and other outsider traditions, feminist law
and religion scholarship may instead argue for the ethical priorities of
vulnerability, belonging, interconnection and compassion in the
61

See, e.g., FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra note 46 (outlining articles compiling
minority perspectives).
62
See, e.g., Emily Hartigan, What is the Matter with Antigone?, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ
AND STABILE, supra note 46, at 85-104 (posing a feminist challenge to the “false
knowability” of Western scientific rationalism).
63
See, e.g., Lydia Johnson-Hill, Three of My Sisters, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 25 (1996)
(describing the experience of oppressed third world women through a poem). For the
narrative approach, see M. Christian Green, From Third Wave to Third Generation:
Feminism, Faith, and Human Rights, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra note 46, at
141-71 (using stories of the lives of religious activists Dorothy Day, Wangari Maathai,
Rigoberta Menchu, and Aung San Suu Kyi to show how “third wave” religious feminism is
critical to the development of “third generation” human rights for women); Emily Hartigan,
What is the Matter with Antigone?, in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra note 46, at
85-104 (reflecting upon the legal suppression of the feminism through the story of
Antigone).
64
See, e.g., Cheryl B. Preston, Deconstructing Equality in Religion, in FAILINGER,
SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra note 46, at 25-62 (deconstructing secular feminist
deconstructions of religion as based on a male standard of comparison, in favor of a feminist
Christian model for equality).
65
See, e.g., Emily Fowler Hartigan, Law and Mystery: Calling the Letter to Life Through
the Spirit of the Law of State Constitutions, 6 J. L & RELIGION 225 (1988).
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development of law and legal systems.66
However we view these directions in law and religion
scholarship, we cannot help but rejoice at the way in which all law
and religion scholars are approaching the banquet of riches plucked
from the garden of law and religion scholarship. As we approach this
banquet as hosts, all bringing the rich stews and luscious desserts of
our traditions to feed each others’ minds and souls, strangers have so
very often turned into friends as the meal progresses. It has been my
gift to be one of the hosts at this table in my twenty-five year tenure
as editor of the Journal of Law and Religion, and I hope to continue
sitting and sharing this feast for a good long while yet.

66
See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Schiltz, A Contemporary Catholic Theory of Complementarity,
in FAILINGER, SCHILTZ AND STABILE, supra note 46, at 3 (describing Allen’s theory of malefemale complementarity as a reflection of the Trinity as a “communion of divine Persons”).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

17

